Streetwise Professor

In its pique (or should I say rage) over US opposition to its invasion of Georgia, Russia is threatening to cut meat and poultry imports from America:

Russia’s agriculture minister said Moscow could cut poultry and pork import quotas by hundreds of thousands of tons, hitting American producers hard and thereby raising prices for American shoppers.

Er, ag ministry guy, reductions in American exports would arguably harm producers, at least in the short run, but this wouldn’t raise prices for AMERICAN shoppers. Let’s go through this slowly. Reduced import quotas would reduce the demand for American produce, which would REDUCE prices in the US. But reduced imports into Russia, or substitution of more costly or lower quality imports from non-US nations would INCREASE prices for RUSSIANS. Given the acute sensitivity of the inflation issue in Russia, this will hardly be popular, though perhaps in the short run the jingos in Russia will no doubt consider it a patriotic honor to pay higher prices for the benefit of spitting on the Americans. But, the fact that the government simultaneously announced its plans to spend an additional $4.1 billion on agriculture (presumably in the form of subsidies or payments to producers) also strongly suggests concerns about the sensitivity of the food price issue. So, one explanation is that the Russian government is trying to get a boost by thumbing its nose at Uncle Sam, but isn’t sufficiently convinced that this kick-the-dog response is sufficiently gratifying to overcome anger over higher food prices. It therefore devotes billions that could be spent on other things that Russia really needs, like, you know, AIDS medications, roads, etc., to cushion the effect on prices.

The article linked above doesn’t say whether Russia will raise import quotas from other countries to offset the effect of the cuts of the US TRQ (the acronym for the the Russian tariff quota program). If they don’t, Russian prices will definitely rise. If they do, Russian prices will rise somewhat as Russia will buy from less efficient (i.e., more costly) suppliers. But this will also mitigate the impact on American producers, as some sales diverted to Russia will be replaced by sales from America.

One thing for sure is that American consumer prices will not rise in the short run or the long run. In the short run, prices will fall more than in the long run, but long run American consumer prices will not rise.

But thanks for the thought!

In the WaPo David Rivkin and Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky (now that’s an interesting name) second the SWP recommendation that we “cry ‘havoc’ and let slip the dogs of accounting.” They write:

The shady cadre running modern Russia has embraced globalization. These “Chekist oligarchs” — to distinguish them from the Western-oriented robber barons who rose in the 1990s, only to be purged by Putin — increasingly dominate lists of the world’s richest individuals. They invest their ill-gotten wealth abroad and maintain opulent residences in London, Paris and the Cote d’Azur. They educate their children at Western universities and even collect Western sports teams.

These tycoons bankrolled Putin’s rise and are the medium by which he has consolidated control over Russia’s vast wealth. Putin and his cronies have used the levers of state power (including trumped-up prosecutions and official intimidation) to enrich themselves and crush rivals. Complex financial mechanisms — often involving major international financial institutions — are in place to launder vast sums for reinvestment abroad. Western banks seeking to profit and curry favor with Russia’s rulers have rushed to underwrite the dubious transactions used to place Russia’s natural resources under Kremlin control.

The oligarchy’s widespread corruption, disrespect for the rule of law and embrace of globalization make it a perfect target for Western “soft power.” Whenever they have jurisdiction to do so — which should be often — U.S. and E.U. regulators should examine the business transactions of people close to Putin’s regime for money laundering or for securities, tax and other economic irregularities. Asset tracing and long statutes of limitation should enable Western authorities to examine years’ worth of business activities. The U.S. Justice Department should aggressively prosecute any instances of Kremlin-connected market manipulation, fraud, tax evasion and money laundering that fall within its reach.

Sounds familiar–and sounds good.

Grrrr.

The U.S. Embassy in Georgia had earlier said the Dallas was headed to the port city of Poti but then retracted the statement. A Georgian official said the port in Poti could have been mined by Russian forces.

Poti’s port reportedly suffered heavy damage from the Russian military. In addition, Russian troops have established checkpoints on the northern approach to the city, and a U.S. ship docking there could have been seen as a direct challenge.

Would be very interested in knowing what’s really going on here. Was the US Embassy talking through its . . . hat? Was it right that the Poti mission was planned, but something caused it to be scrubbed? If so, what? It would have been better not to have said anything than to declare that USCGC Dallas was headed for Poti and then do a Roseanne Rosannadanna-esque “Never mind.” That’s bush league–the question is whether it was Bush league.

In other navy-related FUBARS, apparently the Fernandez story based on a Wired story based on the McClatchey news service stating that the USS Dallas (SSN700-a Los Angeles class fast attack sub) is wrong. That boat is NOT in the Black Sea, having returned to its base in Groton, CT (where I spent this week 30 years ago–eek!) on 21 August. The Dallas had been in the Black Sea on maneuvers and port calls, but began its return to its home port prior to the outbreak of the war.

Nonetheless, it appears that the naval situation in the Black Sea is very tense. The Russians seem nervous as cats over the NATO naval presence there.

Oh, and BTW, re Russian assertions that “battleships” never deliver humanitarian aid–tell that to tsunami victims, and others the US Navy has saved over the years.

Here are two very important sources of information regarding the timeline of the outbreak of the Russo-Georgian War. The first is from the intrepid Michael Totten. The most important aspects of Totten’s report are that (a) the Russians were debouching from the Roki Tunnel almost simultaneously with the commencement of the bombardment of Tskhinvali, and (b) the Georgians launched a desperate attack on a bridge south of the tunnel in an attempt to stall the Russian advance. Given the time to transit the Roki Tunnel, a long, single-lane road winding through the mountain, it is evident that the Russians had a rolling start. Moreover, the improvisational nature of the Georgian attack on the tunnel–which resulted in the deaths of the paratroopers sent on the mission–is consistent with Totten’s source’s assertion that the Georgians were improvising a response to a situation that they did not initiate but which was spiraling out of control. If the Georgian operation in Ossetia had been a planned effort to seize control of the province, step one would have been to seize or disable the entrance to the tunnel. Failure to do so would have been rank incompetence. Instead, from Totten’s description, the Georgians were responding to Ossetian attacks; in the middle of their response, they learned of the Russian advance, and ad libbed a Hail Mary play in an attempt to block the tunnel. They evidently inflict serious losses on the Russians, but didn’t have the combat power to stop them for long.

In my view, these events suggest the following: The Ossetians, in connivance with the Russians, dramatically escalated their aggressive actions against the Georgian troops/peacekeepers in the area surrounding Tskhinvali. The Georgians responded by desperately attempting to reshuffle units from the Abkhazian front–perceived as the more likely trouble spot. At the same time the Russians were moving through the Roki Tunnel–indeed, it is highly likely that their movement began simultaneously with the Georgian move at the latest, and probably before. The Georgians made their forlorn hope stab at the Roki Tunnel with their paratroopers, and tried to fight through Tskhinvali with their main force units in a vain attempt to shut the road before the Russians could deploy. They failed in Tskhinvali, and their forlorn hope was destroyed at Roki. The rest was a foregone conclusion.

If Totten’s timeline is correct, this was clearly a planned Russian invasion of long planning. An extended period of stoking tensions in Abkhazia to serve as a feint diverting attention from the site of their planned attack, drawing Georgian heavy units (such as they were) to that front. Maneuvers designed to put heavy units in place on the borders of Ossetia were carried out in late July. The infiltration of irregulars, followed soon after by a quantum escalation of violence in Ossetia. Nearly simultaneously with the Georgian response to this escalation, the Russian 58th Army moves before the Georgians can react. Every piece makes sense as part of a coherent operational plan. In contrast, the Georgian actions bear all the hallmarks of an ad hoc response to an unexpected escalation in hostilities.

It is very difficult to square this timeline with Russia’s characterization that they were responding extemporaneously to an unprovoked, genocidal attack by Saakashvilli. The Georgians were the ones extemporizing, the Russians the ones acting according to an operational plan. The evidence is that the Russians acted with premeditation, the Georgians without it. That speaks volumes on where the guilt lies.

The Washington Post presents a less detailed chronology that gives the Russians more of a benefit of the doubt than Totten’s, but which nonetheless supports important pieces of his reporting.

When asked about the excesses of Stalin’s Russia, despicable NY Times reporter Walter Duranty was wont to say “you can’t make an omelette with out breaking eggs.” Dmitri Minaev’s post on the new History of Russia 1900-1945 (a textbook for Russian secondary schools) demonstrates that Duranty’s apologia for Stalin has been embraced by the Russian educational establishment/Russian state. Dmitri posts a translation of an article on in Vremya, which I feel is worth quoting in full:

The following is the translation of some excerpts from the article in Vremya by Anatoly Bernshtein.

“The attention of the students should be concentrated on the explanation of the motives and logic behind the actions of the authorities”, write the authors. So, the book is basically the history of the authorities. Here are some uncommon ideas which my grandchildren will probably have to learn: Russia never lagged behind other countries, it only fell behind in the things that “were not a part of the Russian civilization, but borrowings from outside”. In 1914-1917 the Great Russian revolution, modeled after the Great French revolution, took place in Russia. The bolsheviks were guilty in the beginning of the Civil war, while the Whites “in a number of occasions represented a pro-fascist alternative to bolshevism, and had the chances to implement a nationalist model in the future”. The famine in the Soviet villages in 1920s-1930s was not a result of the actions of the Soviet state, but it “was caused both by outstanding weather conditions and by the incomplete collectivization”. The social structure built in the USSR by the end of the 1930s was no socialism or capitalism, but the industrial society. The pact of Molotov-Ribbentrop was a response to the Munich agreement. The entry of the Soviet troops to Poland was the liberation of Ukraine and Belorussia. The Winter war with Finland was won by the USSR who reached its goals. The USSR, probably, was preparing the preemptive war against Germany, but “Stalin assumed that he should wait for the concentration of the enemy’s army for aggression, to make the planned strike look as justified self-defense, but in the summer of 1941 such plan was not yet possible”. The initial defeats in the war were caused by strictly objective reasons. The mass deportations in the course of the war should be discussed with “special restraint and caution”.

An even more obvious task of the book is the justification of the mass repressions in the Stalin’s period. So, recognizing the fact of the mass executions of the Polish prisoners of war in Katyn by NKVD, the authors comment: “It was not only the matter of the political advisability, but also a response to the death of many thousands of Red army soldiers in the Polish prison after the 1920 war, which was initiated by Poland, not the Soviet Russia”.

While in the Soviet schoolbooks the mass repressions were either hushed up or presented as a distortion of the general policy of the communist party, this book tried to give “rational” explanations to the extermination of millions of people by the Soviet regime:

It is important to show the two components of this problem. The first one is an objective force. The resistance to the Stalin’s policy of accelerated modernization and his apprehension of losing control over the situation was the main cause of the “great terror”. Being the only political party, VKP(b) was also the only way of getting feedback for the leaders. At the end, under the influence of the growing oppositional attitude of the Soviet people the party became environment where various political and ideological groups and trends were formed, and was losing its integrity. For Stalin it was a threat of the loss of leadership and even physical elimination (as the results of the voting on the 17th congress of VKP(b) had shown). It was also a threat of the general political destabilization. The high activity of various emigrant organizations increased his apprehension. The usage of the “fifth columns” by external forces in other countries (Spain being the best example) was thoroughly studied by the Soviet leaders. Besides, Stalin had good reasons to consider the military leaders who started their career during the Civil war Trotsky’s adherers. Before the war, facing the choice between the competence and the loyalty, Stalins chose the loyalty of the army’s officership and bureaucracy in general. The negative attitude among the military leaders could not be neglected. It was especially important considering the threats of terrorism against the country’s leaders. The assassination of S.Kirov catalysed these processes. The ideas of the party’s right wing (Bukharin and others) were popular among the party functionaries and it was necessary to oppose them both ideologically and politically. Stalin did not know whence the strike will be blown and so he attacked all known ideological groups and all those who did not support him without reservation. The second component of the matter was subjective, it was explained by the dogmatism of the bolshevist ideology and the personality of Stalin himself.

Now, what conclusions do the authors make of all this?

So, it is important to show that Stalin acted in accordance with the historical situation, acted (as a manager) on a fully rational basis — as a protector of the system, a consistent proponent of the transformation of the country into a centrally managed industrial society, as the leader of the country staring in the face of a large war.

The rational terror, the authors write, was stopped as soon as Stalin understood that the integrity of the society is not threatened anymore. And then Lavrntiy Beriya, another effective manager, began yet another project: “The terror served the goals of the industrial development: NKVD organized planned arrests of engineers and specialists necessary to solve the defense problems and other tasks in Siberia and the Far East. Terror became a pragmatic tool to solve the economic problems.”

Understanding that the scales of the repressions cannot be explained by the logic of “rational management”, the authors propose to review the number of the repressed people: “It must be determined clearly who may be considered repressed. We think it would be correct to include in this number only those who were sentenced to death and executed”. By using this new formula, the authors refuse to recognize those who died in Gulag as victims of the repressions. This position contradicts the law of the Russian Federation “On the rehabilitation of the victims of political repressions”, adopted by the president of Russia on 18 October 1991, which defines the term “repressed” as including those who were deported and removed, deprived of citizenship, exiled and so on.

In brief, everything that Stalin did was rational, and therefore defensible. In other words, once you accept the premise behind–the objective of–a series of actions, as long as those actions are cognizable, rational means of achieving that objective, they are perfectly acceptable, regardless of the consequences. The objective is taken as a given, and immune from any question, or any challenge over whether the goal was worth the cost required to achieve it.

Rapid industrialization is a good thing, so it is worthwhile to incur any cost to achieve it. A single party state is threatened with political destabilization, so by all means genuflect to the decision to liquidate anybody who challenged the leadership, rather than question the wisdom of perpetuating such a state even when its defenders acknowledge that it was cut off from all feedback and inherently brittle.

In other words, once the decision to make the omelette has been made, the number of eggs required to cook it, the damage done to the kitchen, and the number of cooks killed and imprisoned in the preparation, are all irrelevant. And this is the view of history that is endorsed by the Putinists. Those who ignore the lessons of the history lessons are doomed to repeat them.

The Vremya article also reveals the mendacity of the authors of this screed–and their political patrons. One telling example–the Great Famine was the result of bad weather and–wait for it–incomplete collectivization! This is to turn reality on its head. Such a bizarre distortion is so egregious that it is difficult to recall anything as mendacious even from Soviet propaganda.

This isn’t about the past. History never is. It is about the present and the future too. This is just more evidence that the Putin system is a revisionist one, bent on undoing the consequences of the Cold War. Rehabilitation of Stalin and Stalinism, especially when done contemporaneously with the invasion of Georgia, makes it clear that Putin and his minions are hellbent for a trip back to the future.

One last comment. The uncritical attitude towards the maintained assumptions and goals of those in power displayed in the History of Russia 1900-1945 also permeates most of the apologia for Russia’s actions in Georgia. Russia desires to be a Great Power. It views the Near Abroad as its sphere of influence. Russia resents the loss of influence in the post-Soviet era. It seethes at the impudence of cheeky neighbors who until recently were in its thrall. So, anything that the US or the West does (such as expanding NATO, or building missile defenses in Poland or the Czech Republic or recognizing Kosovo’s indpendence or promoting democracy in Ukraine and Georgia) that offends these sensibilities and sensitivities justifies an aggressive Russian response. The invasion of Georgia is a rational response, you see, once you accept the Russian premises about their interests–and ignore any consideration of the interests of others who may be trampled on when the Russians pursue theirs. (See this article for an exemplar of this line of thought. I especially love the line about Poland being “Russia’s historical nemesis.” Since the Time of Troubles, the score has been pretty lopsided in the other direction, dontcha think, Gordon old buddy?)

This approach is purely amoral realpolitik and needs to be recognized as such.  Moreover, it is amoral reapolitik that defers obsequiously to the goals and interests of a kleptocratic regime–a regime, as the textbooks it endorses demonstrates, that worships power and force.  Sadly, playing realpolitik with a such a power usually turns out to be not that realistic in the end.

As I surmised on Sunday, the US Navy (or Coast Guard) will send a ship to Poti, Georgia to deliver humanitarian relief:

The move [Medvedev's recognition of the independence of the rump states of South Ossetia and Abkhazia] came after the U.S. announced it intends to deliver humanitarian aid to the beleaguered Georgian port city of Poti, which Russian troops still control through checkpoints on the city’s outskirts. The aid will be delivered Wednesday by ship, a U.S. embassy spokesman said.

While Western nations have called the Russian military presence in Poti a clear violation of a European Union-brokered cease-fire, a top Russian general countered Tuesday that using warships to deliver aid was “devilish.”

Many of the Russian forces that drove deep into Georgia after fighting broke out Aug. 7 in the separatist region of South Ossetia have pulled back, but at least hundreds are estimated to still be manning checkpoints, that Russia calls “security zones,” inside Georgia proper. Two of those checkpoints are near the edge of Poti, one of Georgia’s most important Black Sea ports. The Russian military is also claiming the right to patrol in the city.

An Associated Press cameraman was treated roughly by Russian troops Sunday when he tried to film Russian movements around Poti. Georgian officials have said much of the port’s infrastructure — radar, Coast Guard ships, other equipment — was destroyed by the Russians.

In a move that angered Russia, the U.S. sent the missile destroyer USS McFaul to the southern Georgian port of Batumi, well away from the conflict zone, to deliver 34 tons of humanitarian aid Sunday. The McFaul left Batumi on Tuesday but would remain in the Black Sea area, said Commander Scott Miller, a spokesman for the U.S. Navy’s 6th Fleet in Naples, Italy.

A U.S. Coast Guard cutter, meanwhile, was headed for Georgia with a shipment of aid. Embassy spokesman Stephen Guice didn’t give details on which ship would aim to enter Poti, but it appeared likely the smaller Coast Guard ship would aim to dock, with the McFaul possibly remaining on guard at sea. “We can confirm that US ship-borne humanitarian aid will be delivered to Poti tomorrow,” Mr. Guice said.

In Moscow, the deputy head of the Russian military’s general staff lashed out at the U.S. naval operation. “We are worried” about the way aid is delivered on warships, Gen. Anatoly Nogovitsyn said. “This is devilish.” “This aid could be bought at any flea market,” he added.

“Devilish.” Excellent (cue Monty Burns voice.)

Ball’s in your court, guys. Watcha gonna do ’bout it?

The Russians have no good options once USCGC Dallas pulls into Poti–which is just why the move is so devilish (in Russian eyes). Deny the delivery of humanitarian relief to sovereign Georgian territory, and they make it clear that they are in violation of international law; that they are really engaged in a punitive mission against Georgia with the intent of unseating the duly elected government, rather than protecting “Russian citizens”; that they have no intent of adhering to their commitments under the “cease fire” agreement; all while running the risk of an escalation that would jeopardize Putin’s long term plans. Allow the delivery of the aid, and they will appear to be climbing down in the face of US pressure.

This episode suggests that Putin let his rage against Saakashvilli and his hormones get the better of him. This was not the move of a self-controlled judo master. Rather than using his opponent’s momentum against him, Putin’s lunge has put him off balance. He must either beat a retreat, or escalate the situation, thereby weakening Russia’s long term position.

How did Putin get into this situation? It seems driven by overconfidence. Where did that come from? Disdain for the Europeans and the United States? Belief that the Euros would not respond because, well, they’re Euros? Belief that the US would not respond because Bush is tired and distracted, an election is underway, we are “bogged down” in Iraq, and that the European Lilliputians would rein us in? The rather predictable effect of isolation from feedback and reasoned challenge that is the hallmark of autocratic systems ruled by fear? All of the above, and more, methinks.

Richard Fernandez provides some very interesting news regarding the American flotilla arriving off the Georgia coast:

Wired describes the allied flottila closing on Georgian coast, including a DDG, an SSN, the command ship USS Mount Whitney (”onsidered by some to be the most sophisticated Command, Control, Communications, Computer, and Intelligence (C4I) ship ever commissioned”) and the Coast Guard cutter USCGC Dallas. Wired describes the naval force:

“The vanguard includes the Burke-class destroyer McFaul (pictured)and the armed Coast Guard cutter Dallas. (Another Dallas, a nuclear submarine, is also in the area.) Trailing behind is the command ship Mount Whitney with, reportedly, Polish and Canadian frigates as escorts.”

The dispatch of a sophisticated 4CI vessel like the Whitney is very interesting. More interesting is the dispatch of an SSN (an attack sub, which is capable of carrying large numbers of land attack cruise missiles, and is not, to state the obvious, optimized for the delivery of humanitarian aid).

Most interesting of all is that Turkey has allowed all of this through the straits. A primary purpose of the Montreux Convention is to deny the ability of major sea powers from using the Black Sea to attack Russia. By letting a large naval force with substantial firepower (in the form of cruise missiles on the DDG and the SSN, and a command ship capable of coordinating combined air and cruise missile strikes) into the Black Sea, Turkey is putting Russia on notice that it opposes the latter’s excellent Georgian adventure.

Committing such a large naval force is also a pretty bold move on the part of the US. One wonders what is next. Although the McFaul entered the port of Batumi, rather than Russian-occupied Poti, if the Russians continue their hold on the latter port one could imagine a scenario in which a humanitarian relief ship is directed to Poti. The Russians would be forced to stop it or let it go. Either alternative would pose grave dangers for the Russians. If they stopped it using any force, or prevented it from delivering its supplies to needy Georgians, or seized the supplies, it would risk escalating the confrontation with the US. If they let it go, they would look weak. A humanitarian naval mission to Poti could be the equivalent of the US quarantine of Cuba during the missile crisis.

Richard Fernandez makes a good point in his piece about the fact that American air and naval power is essentially free from any commitment at the moment. Everybody wailing about our complete lack of military capability due to commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan is thinking only in terms of ground combat power. I’m sure the Russians aren’t. Nor are we.

As Fernandez notes, the Russians can’t be happy about the presence of powerful naval forces in the Black Sea, and the message this sends about the Turkish position. Yet another indication that the unintended consequences of the invasion of Georgia proper may make Russia the biggest loser.

In the end, the verdict on Putin’s Georgia gambit may be the same that Talleyrand delivered in response to Napoleon’s murder of the Duc d’Enghien: “It was worse than a crime. It was a blunder.” Let us hope.

David Johnson, compiler of the invaluable Johnson’s Russia List, is a little bit defensive in today’s issue about the balance in his coverage of the possibility that Russia had prepared its incursion far in advance. I don’t think that he has to be defensive, but it is good that he is going the extra mile and printing Pavel Felgenhaur’s article advancing the hypothesis that this incursion was in motion starting in April. I do disagree with David’s assertion that Russian accounts of Russian operational mistakes, not to say incompetence, are inconsistent with preplanning. Mistakes are characteristic of any military operation, and even if Russia committed more than the normal quota of blunders, this is not surprising given (a) the long history of Russian command blunders being redeemed by mass, and the blood and courage of its soldiers, and (b) the dramatic decay in Russian armed forces in the post-Soviet era.

Several of the articles I saw today, including one in JRL, provide additional evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the Russians had laid the bait, and were ready to pounce with Saakashvilli took it. In the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst Robert Cutler states:

A detailed timeline provided by Georgia’s Prime Minister Lado Gurgenidze during an international telephone press conference disputes that assertion, however. This view is corroborated in most part by several independent sources, and an independent Washington Post reconstruction of events concludes that the Georgian assault on Tskhinvali and the Russian tank column’s emergence from the Georgian end of the cross-border Roki Tunnel could only have been minutes apart at most. Roughly 150 Russian vehicles including armored personnel carriers got through before Georgian forces were able to mount an only partially successful attack on the crucial bridge at Kurta linking the Roki Tunnel with Tskhinvali.

It seems inescapable that Russian tanks must have been on the road from Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia, for some time in order to cross the 100 miles of mountain roads to reach South Ossetia when they did. Novaya gazeta’s respected military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer is only one of several writers who have documented how the Russian invasion is only the culmination of a months-long series of provocations as well as strategic and tactical on-the-ground preparations, for example the construction and equipment of a base near the city of Java, northwest of Tskhinvali, as a refueling depot for Russian armor moving southwards. This should be added to the better-known “railroad repair” troops sent to Abkhazia in recent weeks, who are reliably reported to have constructed tank-launching facilities. The ceremony completing the railway repair was held as late as July 30.

The possibility that Russian tanks were already rolling when the Georgians began shelling, and preempted Georgian attempts to block the road from the Roki Tuunnel, suggests some interesting possibilities, including: (a) the Russians had advanced intelligence of the Georgian assault, and (b) the Russians were so confident that the Georgians would respond to Ossetian provocations that they began their assault in anticipation. In any event, in no way is what happened simply the result of the activation of a contingency plan in response to the Georgian bombardment. Even if the plans had been in place, it would have taken some days to get everything rolling. It is almost certain that they were in the blocks ready to go.

This article also notes that the Russians, for all of their wailing about Georgia’s indiscriminate shelling of Tskhinvali, (a) used the same inaccurate Grad rocket systems, and (b) actually shelled the town more ferociously and indiscriminately than the Georgians did.

Paul Goble’s report that large numbers of Russian journalists were already in Tskhinvali provides further credence to the pre-planning hypothesis.

This article printed in JRL presents a very interesting analysis of Russian operational problems:

Absence of Regional Commands Blamed for Russian Inadequacies in Ossetia

Moskovskiy Komsomolets
August 23, 2008 (?)
Article by Olga Bozhyeva: “Disarmed Forces of the
Russian Federation: Our Army Continues To Win
Only Through its Fighting Spirit”

The dead in Ts’khinvali had not been buried before the medals were being distributed. “Victory” is being conveyed from the television screens. Everywhere, victors. And we don’t judge victors. But should we be reveling in this way over our military victory in the Caucasus? Did anyone, Saakashvili included, doubt that Russia would get the better of Georgia? Consequently, in unleashing war Saakashvili was counting by no means on a military, but on a propaganda, victory. He presented Russia to the world as an aggressor. However much we now repeat over and over “and you,” there’s no washing off us the blood of the people that fell beneath our “pinpoint” strikes. In the West currently even those that are prepared to acknowledge Russia’s retaliatory action as being justified are accusing us of an excessive use of military force. And could it have been otherwise? It probably could. Had we had the army that the politicians have been promising to create for us for more than 20 years now.

From the very outset our army in this military conflict was a hostage to hapless politicians, who had brought the situation to the point of war. The military had to win here not with satellite reconnaissance systems, precision weapons, or methods of waging a non-contact war but, as always, by heroism, blood, and the weapons of the 1960s.

It had neither the Glonass space system nor satellite-guided projectiles nor precision missiles or laser-illuminated projectiles. It had hand grenades and old Soviet tanks, which stalled, creating backups in the Roki Tunnel. It had Grad systems, which are no use for pinpoint strikes. High-explosive bombs missing the target by several kilometers.

And the human beings. General Kulakhmetov, commander of the peacekeeping contingent, who held the defense for many hours while his virtually defenseless people were being hit by Georgian Grads. Major Ketchinov, who at the cost of his life rescued defenseless reporters. Boy conscripts, of whom the MoD had washed its hands, maintaining that contract servicemen alone were fighting in Ossetia. General Shrulev, commander of the 58th Army, who was wounded in the very first engagement.

Knowing that there were insufficient men and equipment for a breakthrough into Ts’khinvali, he himself led the tank column. Might he not have done so? Of course. Only how then could he have looked in the eye the mothers of his fallen soldiers?

But why, for all that, did he go, not waiting for reinforcements? As one officer said, first, because people in the city were being killed, they needed to be rescued, second, because there was pressure from above. The Kremlin had already three times reported that Ts’khinvali was under 58th Army control, although this was not, in fact, the case. “Can you think why it was reported three times,” the officer sadly joked. “Because each such report means one more star on the epaulets. In war to each his own: for some, stars, for some, bullets, for some, eternal remembrance….”

Unfortunately, there are with us always more of the latter. They are subsequently spoken of in television reporting and written about in the papers, and children are taught on the basis of their exploits. We love stories about exploits and heroes.But if, for example, an American child were asked to name heroes of the war in Iraq or Yugoslavia, it is hardly likely that they would be remembered. These were nameless wars. Non-contact, as the military says. They had no battlefields as we customarily understand them. An American soldier never even set foot on this country’s territory throughout the war in Yugoslavia but the outcome of the war was decided in a matter of hours here. First NATO aviation with the aid of satellites that guided it to the targets put the Yugoslav air defenses out of action.The airfields, deprived of cover, were then immediately destroyed. With absolute air superiority US planes released 1,500 precision cruise missiles and rapidly destroyed over 500 facilities of Yugoslavia’s state and military support structure. That was it. This was the end of the war. It had no heroes.

Later some military analysts, tallying the results, said that the Americans had fought poorly since they had been unable to wipeout Milosevic’s army, which lost only 1% of its armored equipment and approximately 500 servicemen. But these analysts failed to consider that all these losses were for the United States “collateral,” unplanned, that is. TheYugoslav Army (aside from the air-defense troops) had not been the target of precision strikes at all. Their target was the state of Yugoslavia itself: its economy and political system. And the United States successfully achieved the elimination of this target.The purpose of our military operation in the Caucasus was, as we now know, the “enforcement of peace on Georgia”. We also achieved this purpose.

But at what price? Our “collateral” losses were the peaceful population. We fought not like the Americans–in non-contact fashion–but in very “contact” fashion even: with artillery, tanks, and infantry. As our heroic fathers and grandfathers did in the last century.

Did Saakashvili not know that this was the only way that Russia was capable of fighting him? He probably did. And there was a calculation in this also, evidently: there would have to be the bloodshed of peaceful people in such a slaughter for it manifestly not to result in the eyes of the world community in Russia’s favor.

And did our politicians really not suspect with what and how their army would fight? Although it is they, it would appear, that had an inadequate notion of this. We have in recent years heard so many times about Russia’s superweapons that both those that listened to them and those that spoke about them believed in these tales.

Only you can’t fight in a war with tales. You need real weapons. And what did we see? We saw a long-familiar picture: our boys riding on top of the armor of the APCs–getting about is safer this way because they are not protected inside the vehicles against armor-piercing shells, which pierce them even at distances of 700 meters and incinerate everything inside. We saw our artillery, which was delivering concentrated shelling with Grads, by no means with some guided projectiles or bombs of the Santimetr, Smelchak, or Gran type.

We saw our downed planes. As the MoD maintains, there were four of them. According to Saakashvili, more than 20, and according to MK’s information, eight. But even if we accept the official figure of four, this is, nonetheless,too many for three days of fighting.

Why were we unable to avoid these losses? Could our ground-attack planes really not have eliminated the radars–the “eyes and ears”of Georgia’s air defenses–then and there? After all, we had been assured that tactical aviation was armed with the X-28 (range of 90 km) and X-58 (range of120 km) anti-radar missiles? Where are they? Why were the precision X-555 missiles not employed? We have been told that they “go right through a window from 2,000 kilometers away.” Two thousand? Splendid! So pinpoint strikes may be conducted without even entering the air-defense zone.

Yes, they may. Only according to our expert, the last time that the MoD ordered a consignment of several dozen X-555s was back at the end of the 1990s. For tests. They were successful, but no more X-555s were ordered–there was no money in the budget. The pilots say that the last three or four of this consignment were fired by Vladimir Putin personally during his celebrated flight on a Tu-160 strategic bomber. So what’s the point of holding the military to account? They fought with what they could, this is why, possibly, they did not always hit the target. When the first reports that Russian aviation was bombing Georgian villages were received, I immediately began calling a pilot friend of mine: “Is this true?” He really took fright, began to make inquiries, and called back several minutes later: “We are not bombing any villages, of course.” He was then silent for a while and softly added: “Well, only if the bombs were off by about eight kilometers.” How much is this–eight kilometers–for tiny Georgia? Thanks to such “pinpoint” attacks of our aviation and artillery, Saakashvili now has an opportunity to wave in the faces of Western politicians photographs of demolished Georgian homes and wounded and dead inhabitants. The simplest thing is to say that all this is a forgery. It is much harder to acknowledge mistakes. Only who should acknowledge them: the military or the politicians that are incapable of arming their own army?

It came to the point of the military, having tired of waiting for the new arms promised it in the national weapons procurement, itself rectifying the situation. Through trophy. In the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone our troops captured more than 100 pieces of equipment, including five Osa air-defense systems, 15 BMP-2s, D-2 guns, Czech-made self-propelled artillery mounts, and American APCs. Of course, none of this is the latest equipment but they were short even of this. As Colonel Igor Konashenkov, aide to the Ground Troops commander in chief, says, “of the 65 captured tanks, we destroyed 21 since they were either beyond repair or of old configuration. The 44 that are in working order, in fine condition, we took for ourselves.”

We are in luck. We have gotten rich. For our own state last year supplied them with only 30 new machines.

The war in Georgia has laid bare not only problems of arms but also of the combat employment of the fighting forces. Military specialists, for example, were shocked by the announcement of the downed Russian Tu-22 aircraft. Everyone has been asking: why was this long-range heavy bomber employed at all in a local conflict? The MoD’s official version–that the Tu-22 was flying for reconnaissance–evoked from the pilots themselves merely a wry smile. Here’s the opinion of our expert:

“Why the Tu-22 was sent there is clear: it carries as much in the way of munitions as 10 Su-25s–up to 20 tons–and could have alone eliminated the entire airfield from where Georgian Su-25s were taking off to bomb Ts’khinvali. But the Tu-22 cannot be employed without preliminary reconnaissance and the elimination in its flight area of enemy air-defense points. None of this was done, of course. As a result, the Tu-22 became a giant target for Georgia’s air defenses. In addition, the Tu-22’s accuracy of targeting from a bombing altitude of 6,000-8,000 meters is of the order of 1.5km–not the best performance characteristic for operation in densely populated area.”

Who sent the crew of the Tu-22 to certain death, it is hardly likely that we will ever know, of course–war writes off everything. Meeting with the military in Vladikavkaz, President Medvedev has already said that they are all great guys, that our Armed Forces have overcome the crisis of the 1990s, and the latest hostilities have shown that combat training in the army is on a sound level.

What else could it be if we won? True, just a couple of months ago General Aleksandr Kolmakov,
first deputy defense minister, said that until recently “the training of our fighting forces had remained at the1960’s-1970’s level.” It is a long time since we had heard such strong and truthful words from army generals. Although combat veterans disagree even with this. They believe that everything is even worse.

“It was known after Afghanistan that you can’t plow up mountains with bombs,” Colonel-General Vitaliy Pavlov, former commander of army aviation and commanding officer of a combat aircraft group of the Russian troops in Afghanistan. “I recall that once, when aiming, I was off by only 50 cm, and the missiles deviated by about 5 kilometers–that’s the mountains for you! Why was the Tu-22 sent to such mountains now? Did the experience of Afghanistan teach nobody anything?…”

It did, but, following all the army shakeups called reform, it has, evidently, been happily forgotten. In Afghanistan, for example, when upon a landing approach several of our military transport planes were shot down in succession, the so-called “Kabul approach”–a super-steep landing with an abrupt maneuver descent–was devised. Now, specialists say, when the Tu-22 crew was assigned the mission, “the flight profile should have been very competently selected and the maneuver developed” also. “But this was not thought through, by all accounts.” Or another example: could we really imagine in Afghanistan that tanks would go on the offensive without air cover provided by army-aviation helicopters? Of course not. But they did in Ossetia. Why? Possibly because there was no time to reach agreement on joint operations. After all, five years ago the reformers took army aviation from the land armies and placed it under Air Force command. The tactics of its employment had nothing to do with it here. They acted according to the principle: all that flies should be in the same hands. It is odd that intercontinental nuclear missiles were not given to it also–after all, they too fly pretty well.

Many people are now asking why the Russian Army took so long to go to the assistance of our peacekeepers when they were being bombarded by Georgian Grads. Why did the enemy planes have air dominance for almost 24 hours? Where was our aviation? These questions were answered for MK by Vitaliy Shlykov, member of the Foreign and Defense Policy Council and chairman of the Commission for Security Policy and Expert Appraisal of Military Legislation of the MoD Public Council: “This is a question of the ystem. And here once again the subject of united commands surfaces. Why was aviation late in appearing? Could the Ground Troops commander have given orders to the pilots? Of course not. This all had to go through superior levels, approval, time, that is, was needed. And don’t forget also about the disputes, poses, honor of the uniform. With the current system of leadership, it could not have been otherwise not only for the Armed Forces but for the country’s defense as a whole.”

The Americans have had united theater commands for exactly half a century now. Each is directed by a four-star general. Everything: Army, Marine Corps, aviation, reports to him in the sphere of command responsibility. He does not in case of necessity need to apply for air support to the commander of the service. This general has only one superior officer–the president or his representative, the defense minister. He needs a maximum of 30 minutes to obtain approval for the employment of all his men and equipment.

Had we had such united commands, our response to Georgia also could have been instantaneous and would not have resulted in such casualties. The Ground Troops, for example, were very well prepared for such a development of events. It had been said in the North Caucasus District since May that a military conflict was inevitable. And intelligence had surely reported this, so no tactical surprise on the part of Georgia was achieved. It is simply that all our troops were waiting for the order, which took too long to get to the fighting forces.

The subject of the formation of regional commands has long been raised here. No one, theoretically, is opposed to their formation, seemingly. But in practice the commander of any service of the Armed Forces is the complete master of his troops, and for some other colleague of his to order him to do something? This is unacceptable. The generals are resisting for the added reason that they are not prepared for leadership of united forces. When the Americans switched to such a system, they had to change the entire structure of military training. We will not get away with the simple appeal–let’s fight together–here either. This has to affect the entire system of military organization, the training of the troops, and the commanders themselves.

It is possible that the politicians and the generals will one day reach agreement on what our army should look like in the 21st century. It would be good were this not to happen too late.This is hardly of any concern to anyone today, when medals are hanging in the buttonholes, in any event. All is well with us for the time being, and all are heroes. But as one expert whom I know said, when politicians adopt a posture of standing up straight without a performance-capable army at their back, this could end badly for them.

Several SWP themes appear in this piece: (1) The importance of organizational decisions regarding the allocation of control over weapons, (2) the lack of new weapons actually reaching the front line troops, and (3) the precision and stealth revolutions have not reached the Russian military.

In recent days I had a very hard time crediting rumors that Obama would choose Joe Biden for his VP. Now that it is a fact, I am still puzzled. The party line seems to be that Biden will appeal to working class, white, ethnic, male voters. In other words, Biden is Obama’s outreach to bitter clingers.

I’ve had the misfortune of observing Joe Biden for over 21 years. During that time, of the many (printable) phrases that have come to mind, none of them are: “Regular guy”; “Joe Sixpack”; or “Common Touch.” They apparently took the Scranton out of the boy when they took the boy out of Scranton. Hardly any senator seems appealing to ordinary guys, and Biden, with his starched shirts, cufflinks, hairplugs, and pomposity doesn’t scream working class appeal. This seems a by-the-numbers, focus-group and consultant driven choice. Not that I’m complaining.

General David Patraeus has stepped up from his position as US commander in Iraq to assume the top slot at CentCom. He leaves a victor, having accomplished what was widely considered impossible–to bring order out of chaos; to defeat Al Qaeda in Iraq; provide the security necessary for Iraq to take its first tentative steps towards a political settlement; and to rescue American credibility in the region and the world.

In brief, Patraeus achieved what I said was possible in Ridgeway, Abrams, and Patraeus. I was sanguine about the surge from the beginning, arguing that the more effective employment of the most formidable military the world has ever seen would retrieve a seemingly hopeless situation; that a more aggressive use of our forces and a wise application of tried-and-true counterinsurgency techniques would prevail; that seizing the initiative would work wonders. Through his strategy and steadfastnesses, Patraeus joins the pantheon of true American military heroes. (Max Boot made the Ridgeway comparison today.)

In the Ridgeway post I stated that the primary obstacle to success was political: would Patraeus have the time and political support required to make his strategy work? Here the credit goes to George Bush, and to a lesser degree, McCain. Bush fought a war of his own, a political one, absorbing almost continuous political and personal blows while engaging in what amounts to an epic holding action. It is a testament to his will, and in this instance, his judgment. It is also a testament to the nature of the American political system. The power of the veto, and the ability of a strong minority to block legislation in the Senate, make it difficult to change the status quo and reverse course on divisive issues. This provides a ballast to the American system that enhances the credibility of commitments in a way that is not possible in parliamentary systems.

There are wider political ramifications of Patraeus’s success. Obama’s disgraceful record on the surge is well known. Not only has his judgment proved wildly wrong, he has been, ahem, less than honest in his attempts to deflect scrutiny and criticism of that judgment.

The crowning disgrace, however, relates to Patraeus directly. During his recent visit to Iraq, Obama denigrated American military commanders’ impassioned pleas that they be allowed to finish the job by saying that their perspective was narrow and blinkered; that as Commander-in-Chief it was his responsibility to take a global perspective on American military commitments and strategies. He thereby implied directly that Patraeus and his subordinates in Iraq were parochial in their outlooks, and were making recommendations that were contrary to America’s broader interests.

The condescension was breathtaking, the insult stunning. At the time Barry Obama uttered these remarks, Patraeus was already slotted to take over Central Command. Does Obama seriously believe that a thoughtful, educated, experienced soldier like Patraeus, knowing that he would soon assume broad responsibilities for military policy–including responsibility for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the two places Obama identified as more important than Iraq–would not have considered the broader ramifications of his recommendations? Does Obama really believe that Patraeus and his subordinates do not think deeply–much more deeply than he, or that he is even capable of–about the broader strategic, geopolitical, and military situation? Does he really believe that they are both unwilling and incapable of balancing American interests in Iraq with competing demands on American military resources? Does He believe that only He is sufficiently broad minded and intelligent to make the right trade-off? On what basis could he possibly arrive at that conclusion? Certainly not experience, education, training or inclination. On each of these scores Patraeus beats him like a drum. Perhaps Obama played Risk a couple of times in college, but being community organizer (whatever), political operator in Chicago, part time lawyer, part time Constitutional law lecturer, state legislator and full time self-promoter are hardly experiences that foster a broad geostrategic outlook. Patreaus is a scholar-soldier/soldier-scholar. He and his colleagues in Iraq and in the military generally have been debating, discussing, analyzing and strategizing the best ways to employ America’s military forces for years. This does not guarantee that any individual one of them is right on any particular issue, but it certainly means that a dilettante like Obama should be more than a little cautious in making such conclusory judgments in opposition to theirs.

In sum, David Patraeus is a great general and a great American. We can certainly trust his strategic judgment far more than we can trust Barry Obama’s. Obama’s opinion to the contrary just provides further evidence, as if any was needed, of his overweening arrogance and fundamental unfitness for the position of Commander-in-Chief.